There may be errors in spelling, grammar, and accuracy in this machine-generated transcript.

Caleb Newquist: It's not difficult to imagine you're leaving work late. Not something you do regularly. But this week it was crunch time, so it needed to be done. You're walking to your car when you notice at a distance, the head of one of the departments at your workplace. Someone you recognize but have never had a reason to talk to. They're standing at the back of their vehicle with a cart that has several stacks of tablet computers on it. The gate on the vehicle. A dual tone Range Rover is open [00:00:30] as they load them carefully into the back. You stay quiet, not wanting to be noticed. They load the last of the computers into the Range Rover, so you sneak quietly into the driver's seat of your non Range Rover car. And because you can't help yourself, you mutter under your breath, that sure is a lot of tablet computers.

Earmark CPE: If you'd like to earn CPE credit for listening to this episode, visit earmark Cpcomm. [00:01:00] Download the app, take a short quiz and get your CPE certificate. Continuing education has never been so easy. And now on to the episode.

Caleb Newquist: This is Oh my fraud. A true crime podcast that follows trails of paper instead of trails of blood. I'm Caleb Newquist. How's everybody doing? Good. Great. Um, no, [00:01:30] Greg has not come back. Um, no, he hasn't even emailed me lately. Uh, I'm. But I'm sure he's fine. He's probably. He's probably great, actually. Uh, we've been receiving emails from some of you wishing Greg a fond farewell, and that's that's very nice. Uh, I'm sure what he would really like is if you left a five star review like this one that I'm about to read. Uh. It goes. I am not an accountant. I don't even like spreadsheets and numbers. I have no interest in CPE, but I love this podcast. I've learned so much. [00:02:00] I play it in reverse to learn how to do a better job of embezzlement and other financial crimes. It's been a real godsend. Thanks, guys, and I guess I'll say you're welcome. I look, I look forward to telling your story of a failed fraud in a future episode. Uh, that was on Apple Podcasts somewhere, I don't know, and they had a terrible name, so I can't. I didn't even use it. Anyway, thanks for the rating. Thanks for the review. Uh, if you're a regular listener, do us a favor and rate [00:02:30] the show and leave a review and share how you're using it to commit a fraud and and how that's going. Uh, really? Uh, actually, don't do that. Um, please.

Caleb Newquist: If you are committing a fraud, turn yourself in immediately. But hire a lawyer because you know that's your right to have legal representation. Also, if your organization or conference needs a live presentation on fraud or ethics, then that is how you can reunite. Greg and I, the new Jersey society of CPAs, [00:03:00] did it. Greg and I will be at their convention and expo on June 5th in Atlantic City. So if you're a CPA and you're in new Jersey and you want to catch a one night only until the next one reunion tour, uh, get yourself to Atlantic City, uh, this June. There's a link to the show's page in the show notes. Of course, we also do webinars, if that's more your speed and or if you're not in new Jersey. Yeah. And you're not going to go to the new Jersey show, but you would like us to do something remotely. [00:03:30] Uh, we we will do you a webinar. Okay. And we'll even do it clean because. Because we're stand up guys like that email. Oh, my. Fraud@earmarks.com. To get more information on pricing and availability. Jamie Patron began working as an administrator within the Department of Emergency Medicine at Yale University School of Medicine in 2008. [00:04:00] She had spent the previous nine years, starting in 1999, holding various other administrative positions within Yale Medical and also Yale-New Haven Hospital. Now, administrative is one of those weird words that could really mean anything, um, in the context of working at a university.

Caleb Newquist: But from what I've gathered, a big part of Jamies job was purchasing various things for the Department of Emergency [00:04:30] Medicine. Stuff like laptops, tablet computers, cameras, various camera equipment, as well as all the software you know that comes with all that stuff. By 2019, Jamie had become the lead administrator and director of finance and administration for the Department of Emergency Medicine. But it didn't take a promotion for Jamie to take full advantage of her position within Yale Med. She had been enjoying the perks of her job [00:05:00] for quite some time already. If you ever looked around your workplace or your college, school or wherever. See all the stuff and wondered how it all gets there. Like desks and Herman Miller chairs and computers with multiple monitors, the kitchen is stocked with snacks and drinks and coffee cups, supply [00:05:30] closets full of BIC pens and reams of paper and sticky notes and substandard facial tissue. The business fairy just doesn't show up with all that stuff when you have the ribbon cutting ceremony. Someone had to buy it. They bought all of it. Someone picked it out, they ordered it, they paid for it. And then it showed up at, you know, this place of business or whatever. Your organization is a government, a nonprofit. The fancy word for this in the business world, as many of you probably know, is procurement. Now, [00:06:00] if you work in a small organization, the process of procurement is probably not that complicated.

Caleb Newquist: There's probably one person who serves as the office manager, and that person is in charge of buying all the things. If you need something, you go to a, you know, you go to a woman named Gail or a guy named Russ or whoever, and you ask them for the thing or things that you need, and Gail or Russ or whoever gets it for you. You don't have to find it. You don't have to pay for it. That's their job. Then the thing shows up [00:06:30] and you get to use it for whatever it's supposed to be used for. In larger organizations, this gets a little more complicated. Sometimes there's a whole procurement department, and it's staffed with people who do all the finding and buying and paying for the stuff. Or maybe you work for a particular department and you have one person in your department who does all the finding and buying and paying. But regardless of the size of the organization, there are oftentimes rules in place to make sure that the person doing the buying isn't [00:07:00] getting carried away. You know, spending too much buying stuff they shouldn't. That's why you end up with a substandard facial tissues and paper towels. Someone's trying to stay within their budget. But also there's the buying of expensive things like computers or office furniture. There are rules that usually say that the person buying the stuff can spend up to X amount of dollars without getting approval from the boss.

Caleb Newquist: If the purchase goes over that X amount of dollars. Then [00:07:30] the person doing the purchasing has to get an okay from the boss. Again, keep things from getting out of hand. Keeping an eye on things. It's just a smart way to do business. In 2020, Jamie's superiors asked her about a budget variance and a high volume of computer purchases. Could you hear me doing the air quotes? That's what I was doing. [00:08:00] She simply explained that quote her department was updating equipment. In addition to working with Yale-New Haven Health on a new program. A short time later, in 2021, the school got an anonymous tip that Jamie was, quote, ordering suspiciously high volumes of computer equipment, some of which was placed into her personal vehicle. After receiving the tip, Yale officials contacted the FBI, which opened an investigation on August 25th, 2021. The [00:08:30] very next day, August 26th, a couple of important things happened. First, the FBI got a search warrant for seven boxes containing packages that had been dropped off by Jamie Patron at a Fedex location in orange, Connecticut. The previous day, those boxes were set to be delivered to a business in New York. Second, investigators observed Jamie Patron drive numerous boxes that had been loaded into the back of her Range Rover SUV to the same Fedex location [00:09:00] in orange, Connecticut. Again, those boxes were bound for New York. When the FBI seized those boxes from Fedex, they found 94 Surface Pro tablet computers.

Caleb Newquist: And as it turns out, records provided by Yale to the FBI showed that Jamie Patron had placed an order with one of the school's vendors for $144,000 in Surface Pro tablets on August 24th, 2021. The FBI's complaint said that Jamie Patron provided them with a voluntary [00:09:30] statement that said she had been carrying on the scheme, quote, for several years, possibly as many as ten. She also estimated that 90% of her computer related purchases were fraudulent. 90%. That's a lot. Just over a week later, on Friday, September 3rd, 2021, Jamie Patron turned herself in to the FBI. She was charged with mail fraud, wire fraud and money laundering. The [00:10:00] FBI's complaint outlined the details of patron's scheme and fortunately for everyone except for maybe Jamie, it was pretty simple. For an organization even of a modest size, you can't have someone approving every single purchase order that comes through. It just isn't practical. Such was the case with Jamie Patron working within the Department of Emergency Medicine at [00:10:30] Yale University School of Medicine. Jamie could make authorized purchases for virtually anything without his superiors approval so long as the purchase was for less than 10,000 bucks. Now you probably see where this is going. Using the information given to them by Yale officials, the FBI found that Jamie had been breaking up orders of computer equipment so that none of them exceeded $10,000, thereby avoiding a review and necessary approval.

Caleb Newquist: Even [00:11:00] still, Jamie lied on purchase order forms and in emails about what these computers were for. She then arranged to have the computers shipped to an out-of-state business that turned around and paid her for the hardware into a bank account of a business that Jamie was the principal of. In one instance, detailed by the FBI's complaint, Jamie directed one of her colleagues to order 100 Surface Pro tablets for an upcoming medical study. The colleague [00:11:30] prepared 12 purchase orders for eight Surface Pros each and one purchase order for four. Now, I don't know anything about this colleague who prepared these purchase orders for her. Or how Jamie convinced her to keep everything under 10,000 bucks, but she managed to do that. Each purchase order for eight computers came to a total of $9,102.56. The purchase [00:12:00] order for four computers came to $4,551.28. So nothing's going to draw. You know that that doesn't break through the threshold. So no, no superior approval necessary. The out-of-state business then sent Jamie shipping labels for all of the computers on May 27th, 2021 with the subject line label 527, 2021 and the text contents [00:12:30] 100 Exp. Surface Pro 7512 gigabyte i7. Maybe it could be more clear, but it seems pretty clear. That same day, May 27th, the out-of-state business wired $71,800 to the bank account controlled by Jamie Patron's business, Massive Entertainment. The packages were shipped from orange, Connecticut, on June 3rd and delivered to a New York address on June [00:13:00] 4th.

Caleb Newquist: The FBI believed that since January of 2021, Jamie had ordered over 8000 Surface Pro tablets, and from May 20th 7th to August 19th alone, she had fraudulently ordered $2.1 million in computer hardware. That 8000 computers is a I don't think I'm overstating this. That is a shitload of computers. Since 2018, the FBI estimated [00:13:30] that Jamie had drafted thousands of false purchase orders, totaling approximately $30 million. But they also believed that the scheme had started as far back as 2013. Now, you might think that a person purchasing thousands of tablet computers on their employer's dime, reselling them [00:14:00] and pocketing the money for almost a decade would have been keeping a low profile. You know, try to keep things chill so nobody would be the wiser. No. Jamie Patron was living a pretty flashy life when she was charged. The FBI complaint noted that she currently had several nice vehicles, including a 2014 Mercedes-Benz G550. [00:14:30] And if you're curious, those g550s are those like boxy SUVs that you feel like you see in in in movies like, uh, Syriana. I feel like when I think of that movie Syriana, I think of those Mercedes driven around by like, Saudi billionaires. That's what I that's what I picture in my mind. She had one of those. It was a 2014, but still they're nice. She had a 2017 Range Rover. And if you know Range Rover, she had one [00:15:00] of the autobiography editions, which is like the tricked out version.

Caleb Newquist: So nice. 2015 Cadillac Escalade Premium. I don't know anything about it. Cadillac's so, but apparently premium sounds nice, I don't know. 2020 Mercedes-Benz E450 A I confess I do not know what the E450 is off the top of my head. I'm sure it's nice. Uh, 2016 Cadillac Escalade and a 2018 Dodge Charger because, you know, That's [00:15:30] kind of fun, I guess. She also had three houses, three houses in Connecticut and another in Lithia Springs, Georgia. And I'm just kind of curious because I didn't take the time to do this. I am curious where Lithia Springs, Georgia is. And this is real time geography research. This is how the sausage is made. Let's see. Lithia Springs is [00:16:00] west slightly northwest of Atlanta. It's in Douglas County. Looks like it's a small town. It's probably very nice. Land is not too far. But anyway, that's Lithia Springs, Georgia. She had a house there, too. So six cars, four houses. And you know, when you got flashy shit, got to put it on the gram, right? [00:16:30] Is that what people call it? I don't know what people call it, but whatever you're posting, wherever you have social media, you know, you know, you gotta put stuff on there. So the Instagram account for Jamie and her husband's business, Massive Entertainment, featured many photos of their automobiles, as well as pictures of other assorted loot. And on some vacations. And I should say, for the record, Jamie's husband was not charged in this scheme.

Caleb Newquist: He wasn't charged with anything, but he is [00:17:00] in a lot of the pictures. So for whatever that's worth. In late March 2022, Jamie Patron pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and one count of filing a false tax return. Yes, as fraud aficionados know, you are supposed to pay tax on your ill gotten gains. In Jamie's case, [00:17:30] she filed false tax returns from 2013 through 2016, in which she falsely claimed as business expenses the cost of the stolen equipment. Yes, she wrote stolen equipment off on her tax return for four years. That's not. You know, if you don't pay for it, you don't get to take it as a write off. Right. But I have to say, it is gutsy. But at least she's still trying to adhere to the tax law. [00:18:00] Funny thing, though, is that she just stopped filing tax returns altogether in 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020. She must have figured while she was, you know, selling hot tablets, she might as well throw some bogus tax returns into the mix. Those non filed tax returns cost the U.S. Treasury over $6 million. And so as part of her plea agreement, Jamie surrendered all those fancy automobiles I just told you about, as well as [00:18:30] her four houses and over $560,000 that was in her business's bank account. All told, Jamie had caused a loss to Yale of $40,504,200.

Caleb Newquist: In.

Caleb Newquist: October 2022. She was sentenced to nine years in prison, followed by three years of supervised release. She's serving her sentence at the Federal Correctional Institute in Danbury, Connecticut. So [00:19:00] what did we learn? Did we learn anything? This is where I'm really missing Greg, because Greg always learns things and I'm usually not paying attention anyway. No, we did learn some things. Um, I think the first lesson is something that we've underscored in many stories, uh, which is Fraud can happen anywhere. Yale Medical is part of an elite organization. It's, you know, this is [00:19:30] an Ivy League university in the United States. And regardless of how you feel about all that, the fact remains Yale is a large, sophisticated, elite school, and its medical school was a victim of a $40 million fraud. Now, an Ivy League school isn't exactly the most sympathetic of victims. Yale's endowment is $41 billion as of 2024. And but most people [00:20:00] would probably think, oh, well, something like that would never happen at a place like Yale. And it did. It did happen. And, you know, that is that that just goes to show that fraud can happen anywhere, even at a place like Yale. Um, for the record throughout the case. Since the case was made public, Yale maintained that it had, quote, worked to identify [00:20:30] and correct gaps in its internal financial controls, which are great, but that does serve as a nice segue into our second lesson, which is internal controls.

Caleb Newquist: They kind of had some. Right? They had uh, uh, they had the, the threshold, the $10,000 threshold, purchasing threshold. So if if you're spending more than 10,000, you had to get approval. Okay. Um, and they even they, they had a review or an internal [00:21:00] audit of some kind that initially found the, the quote unquote, budget variance that, uh, that they had to question Jamie about, but that she successfully explained away. Right. So they did have some internal controls, but they weren't very effective. Right. So Jamie easily avoided that $10,000 threshold. None of the purchase orders that she, uh, wrote was over that $10,000 [00:21:30] threshold. And she did it over and over and over and over again. Literally hundreds of times. Hundreds of times, maybe thousands. The final tally isn't, you know, I don't know what the final tally is, but the lesson, I think, is that internal controls are great, but they are not set it and forget it. Uh, especially, you know, I think with the threshold you're looking, you should really be looking at transactions that are below that threshold. Also, [00:22:00] that should be part of the control stuff that are below it but close to it. And this may be, uh, if, if you're one of those Bank Secrecy Act people. Right. If you know your Bank secrecy Act, multiple related Actions within a specified time period are flagged that increase or sorry that that exceed the $10,000 threshold.

Caleb Newquist: Right. We've talked about that before, where if you walk into a bank and you try to make a deposit of more than $10,000, [00:22:30] they have you fill out a form because that's going to get flagged and somebody's going to look at it. But if you also make multiple deposits or there's multiple transactions that exceed that amount, say if you did three for 4000 or something like that, then those would get looked at too. A policy like that, it does, it isn't it isn't exactly clear that that was the case at Yale. But if they had a policy like that, they probably would have caught Jamie's [00:23:00] fraud because she ordered 100 computers in the example that they gave the example that the FBI put in their complaint, they had 13 different purchase orders, and they were all for like 9000 bucks. And if they are all in and let's say she did it from 13 different vendors. Number one, that would be highly unlikely, I doubt. Yale Medical has 13 different places that they buy computers from, but maybe they do, I don't know. But still, if you're [00:23:30] buying, if one department is buying that many computers and you see that they're all under the $10,000 threshold, but they're all for the same kinds of computers, then isn't that weird? That seems weird. I don't know, maybe my tolerance for weird is low, but in any case, that would be something to think about.

Caleb Newquist: Or that's a lesson that you should consider. Um, and also the budget variance that they investigated. That's part of a review, right. Like a, you know, management review saw some. My guess [00:24:00] is that this budget variance was it meant she went way over budget on buying computers. Like you have a line item for computers. It says, well you can spend you can spend $50,000 this year, Jamie. And this says that you spent $500,000. That is a big variance. And she just explained it away as that the department was updating equipment, and they had a new program at the hospital at Yale-New Haven Health, and apparently that satisfied [00:24:30] the people questioning her about it. And I don't know, maybe they shouldn't have been satisfied by that. I don't know, um, insufficiently skeptical perhaps, anyway. But I will just mention, um, that management review and internal audits are the are two of the most common ways that frauds are detected. But in this case, [00:25:00] neither one of them quite worked. Right. Another lesson is that Jamie was a long time employee of Yale. Okay. Remember she started working there in 1999. That means her fraud started 14 years later. I have not been at my current employer even half that long. So who's going to suspect her? Again, [00:25:30] not only can fraud happen anywhere, I think it can be perpetrated by anyone. You know, even a a seasoned employee who is seemingly trustful, trustworthy and and has been with your organization for a very long time.

Caleb Newquist: And to make matters only slightly worse, the ACF report to the nations finds in that 2024 report, they find that the longer an employee is with an organization, the [00:26:00] amount of the fraud goes way, way up. So, for example, employees with 1 to 5 years of experience at the organization. The median loss is $100,000. But if the employees have more than ten years with the company or the the organization, the median loss was $250,000. So what does that tell you? Well, it tells you that if you have long standing employees, they know how your business works. And if they know how your business works, [00:26:30] then they know where the cracks are. And if they know where the cracks are and they have an opportunity and they have some kind of pressure, then they can probably commit a fraud. Speaking of which, it is not clear from all the research that I did and talking with Zach, my producer, it is not clear what Jamie's pressure was other than that more money is better than less money. And I guess that's a pressure. But it isn't like it's [00:27:00] not like you have, you know, deep gambling debts kind of pressure. So that's kind of where the at least for the fraud triangle bit. That's where there's a little bit of an unknown variable there. Anyway, another lesson small fraud can easily snowball into big fraud.

Caleb Newquist: So irregularities if you come across them, even if they're small, [00:27:30] maybe think twice about it before chalking it up to immateriality. So if you're a listener and not an accountant or not, you know, or or an accountant and forgot what Immateriality is at a place like Yale with a $41 billion endowment, $40 million is not a lot of money. It's not a lot of money by a long shot. However, in [00:28:00] the context of everyday life, $40 million is a lot of money. Okay, So at, you know, 4 to $5000 invoices or 4 to $5 or purchase orders, purchase orders for 5 to 9000 bucks. And that happens 8000, 10,000, 12,000 times. However many times it happened that added up to a big fraud of $40 million. So again, check out the small stuff because sometimes it [00:28:30] turns into big stuff. Okay, another lesson ACF report of the nations. How often do perpetrators exhibit behavioral red flags? That question is in that report every year. And in that finding, which again is occupational fraud, 39% of perpetrators are living beyond their means. That is the number one behavioral red flag. And Jamie and her husband, [00:29:00] who I reiterate, was not charged with anything. They were showing off their flashy shit on their businesses Instagram page, so it was clear six, six cars, four homes, nice things, nice nice things. And I mean, I look, a director of finance is a nice job, but six cars, four houses, I don't know.

Caleb Newquist: Seems weird. Right? Somebody somebody was connected with her on Instagram, right? I don't know, maybe [00:29:30] not, maybe not. But in any case, living beyond their means. Also, this fraud was discovered via a tip, right? If you remember, Yale reported this to the FBI, and that's how FBI initiated their investigation. So somehow someone inside a Yale med suspected something was going on. We aren't sure, but someone was [00:30:00] suspicious enough that they went to the FBI. And as the ACF reported, the nations tells us this is the most common way that frauds are discovered. So again, was an internal audit. It wasn't a management review. It was a tip. It was a tip within Yale and then Yale. Tip to the FBI. 43% of occupational frauds, according to that ACF report to the nations, are discovered via tip. And it is that is by far the number one way that frauds are [00:30:30] discovered. So make tips, make make your organization, make tips possible. Give people avenues to report those so when they see something, they can say something. Okay, so, um, I think I would just say that what I appreciate about this case, this is kind of a classic. This is a classic. Oh, my. Fraud. Fraud. Uh, we have. This. This [00:31:00] story made me think of a lot of episodes that we've done in the past.

Caleb Newquist: For example, Dixon, Illinois. Um, that was a big fraud at a at a very small town in, um, in central Illinois. Central Illinois. Yeah, there's the geography again. Um, $50 million from that small town. Okay. So $50 million. So the the contrast being that $50 million really hurt Dixon, Illinois pretty badly. [00:31:30] Uh, in the case of $40 million missing from Yale. I mean, again, not exactly a sympathetic victim. It is hard to say, uh, what, uh, what what damage was done by this other than maybe some mild embarrassment for the school? Um, uh, you know, that is, um, literally one person, uh, can and can call the school up [00:32:00] and say, I'd like to make a $50 million donation to Yale. And, you know, I mean, that happens with some kind of regularity there. So, um, not to, you know, I don't know. I'm sure someone at Yale would gladly correct me about why I'm missing, why this is misguided. But the point is, um, you have a single employee who perpetrated a very large fraud by themselves in the situation of Yale and the situation of Dixon, Illinois. Right. Okay. [00:32:30] It also made me think of our story about Nathan Muller. And if you get a chance, you should definitely listen to our interview with Nathan Muller because he tells us exactly how he did his fraud that he did about over 20 years ago. But in the case of Nathan, he had basically unilateral authority to write himself checks.

Caleb Newquist: And he was able to do that because he and the people that worked in his department shared passwords. And they had some like cracks in their internal controls and he was able to exploit that. Um, similar case [00:33:00] here where Jamie, uh, was the head of her department. She had unilateral authority to approve purchases, uh, up to a certain dollar amount. And she did that, and she ordered her, uh, I'm guessing subordinates, but she had coworkers do it for her, too, and there was no review or monitoring in place to check in on that. And so only until a tip came later in both of those situations, did someone, uh, say, [00:33:30] uh, maybe we should look a little closer at this again? Uh, tips being possible. I don't know how many of our stories end with people, um, I or I don't know how many of our cases end with tips, uh, being the source of how the the fraud is discovered. I would have to say, uh, the vast majority of them, um, and in this case is no different. So yeah, the organizations have to have avenues for people to report, to report suspicious [00:34:00] what they think might be suspicious activity. Um, and one other one, uh, Rosalind School District, uh, that was a case of where you had someone, uh, making purchases for themselves. They were making personal purchases with money that was not theirs and having it shipped.

Caleb Newquist: In that case, if you remember, I think it was one of the administrators was ordering stuff from Home Depot or or, you know, whatever [00:34:30] the whatever the DIY joint on Long Island is. And they were having it shipped to their house in Long Island. And that is, uh, slightly brazen, uh, and, and but, you know, I have to say, gutsy, you just if you feel that confident that you can just use your employer's money to to go on a spree at Home Depot and just have it shipped directly to your house. That's that's that's kind of gutsy. In the case of Jamie, of course, she didn't have it [00:35:00] shipped to her house, but she had those computers shipped to her place of work. She was using her work email address to do a lot of this communication. Um, and, yeah, uh, just kind of was operating kind of in broad daylight, you know, perpetrating this fraud in broad daylight. And it was kind of astonishing that she got away with it for as long as she did. So, yeah. Roslyn school district. Um, oh, and I guess the other thing I would say about [00:35:30] that is that schools, you know, Roslyn, is a, you know, public high school in New York state. This was a private, uh, university in Connecticut. Uh, but schools are schools are, you know, common victims, or they are susceptible to fraud because a lot of their, um, uh, operations are decentralized.

Caleb Newquist: And that was the case with Yale. So there you go. Education institute. [00:36:00] Educational institutions. Be careful. Okay. Be careful. Okay. That's it for this episode. And remember, there's no rule that says you have to post all your flashy loot from your fraudulent activities on Instagram. You don't have to do it. You don't have to. It's not. It's maybe not as much fun. [00:36:30] It's maybe not as much fun. But, you know, I suppose if you if you're interested in keeping the fraud going, maybe you wouldn't do that. I don't know, this is not legal advice, but just a thought. If you have questions, comments or suggestions for stories. Drop me a line at omnifrog@earmarks.com or hit me up on LinkedIn. I'll try to respond in a reasonable amount of time. Oh my fraud is created, written, produced [00:37:00] and hosted by me. Caleb Newquist Zach Frank is my co-producer, audio engineer, and music supervisor. Rate review and subscribe to the show wherever you listen to podcasts. If you listen on earmark, that's where you can get CPE. If that's your thing, it's a lot of your thing. Check out earmark if you haven't already, and if you don't, you don't need CPE. Then you've probably stopped listening by now. I'm sure you're done. Join us next time for more avarice, swindlers and scams from stories that will make you say, oh my [00:37:30] fraud.